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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Manuel Castro contends the district court misunderstood both the potential probative
value and the risk of undue prejudice from certain propensity evidence in this case. As a result,
its decision to admit that evidence, which the district court already describes as a "close call,"
was an abuse of its discretion. The State's responses on the merits are overly-simplistic and
contrary to the applicable legal standards. Moreover, its harmless error argument is based on an
improper standard, one which the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected. In fact,
if the State's standard were used, the Supreme Court has said it would create an independent
violation of the Fifth Amendment. For all those reasons, this Court should reject the State's
arguments. As such, it should reverse the decision to admit the propensity evidence and remand
this case for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Castro's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by determining the risk of undue prejudice from
admitting evidence of Mr. Castro's gang affiliations did not substantially outweigh the minimal
probative value it had toward his motive.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Determining The Risk Of Undue Prejudice From
Admitting Evidence OfMr. Castro's Gang Affiliations Did Not Substantially Outweigh The
Minimal Probative Value It Had Toward His Motive

A.

Just Because Propensity Evidence Might Fit Into The State's Theory Of The Case, That
Does Not Make The Propensity Evidence Relevant As A Matter Of Law
The district court rejected Mr. Castro's argument that the riot statute requires the State to

prove a community of purpose between the participants in a riot. (See generally Tr., p.262, L.10
- p.266, L.22.) However, since that decision means mere participation creates liability under the
riot statute, that decision also reveals that the motives of the various participants are not
particularly material to the charged offense. As such, the district court's decision to admit the
propensity evidence of Mr. Castro's gang affiliation because it was highly probative to his
motive and intent (Tr., p.21, Ls.11-13) was an abuse of discretion, since it demonstrates the
district court's misunderstanding of relevance in this regard. (App. Br., pp.6-7.) The State's
response - that since the State's theory was that the fight was gang-related, that evidence of gang
affiliation was relevant under I.R.E. 404(b) (Resp. Br., pp.6-8) - is overly simplistic and not
consistent with the applicable precedent.
The fact that evidence might be consistent with a party's theory is not a sufficient basis
on which to deem it relevant as a matter of law. To be relevant as a matter of law, the other act
"must be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than
propensity." State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (emphasis added). As a result, the Court of
Appeals held that, even though the evidence in question might have been relevant the concept of
intent under the State's theory of the case, it was not relevant as a matter of law under
I.R.E. 404(b) because intent was not a material and disputed issue relating to the charge at issue.
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State v. Folk, 157 Idaho 869, 879 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, the Court of Appeals explained, the
act itself proved any associated intent. Id. As such, the propensity evidence was not particularly
probative to intent, and so, should not have been admitted on that basis. Id. Here, as in Folk, the
district court concluded that the act of participation itself was sufficient to show liability under
the riot statute. As such, the questions of motive and intent, to the extent they were material at
all, were demonstrated by the act itself Compare Folk, 157 Idaho at 879. Therefore, as in Folk,
the propensity evidence was not particularly probative to show motive and intent. Since the
district court did not appreciate the actual probative value of that evidence, its weighing of the
probative value against the risk of undue prejudice was, like the weighing in Folk, an abuse of
discretion.
The district court's decision that participation is sufficient also demonstrates why why the
State's reliance on State v. Almaraz is unpersuasive.

(See Resp. Br., p.7 (quoting State v.

Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 591 (2011)). In Almaraz, the defendant was charged with first-degree
murder.

Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 588.

Murder is a specific-intent crime.

See I.C. §§ 18-

4001, -4002 (defining murder as killing "with malice aforethought," and malice is "a deliberate
intention to unlawfully take away life"). Therefore, motive was a separate, material and disputed
issue concerning the crime charged in Almaraz, and thus, propensity evidence could be probative
in that context. However, since riot is, according to the district court's decision, a general intent
statute akin to battery, Almaraz is distinguishable from this case.
Thus, under a proper understanding of the relevance prong, the district court
misunderstood the potential probative value of Mr. Castro's gang affiliation, and that
demonstrates its already-close decision to admit that evidence was an abuse of its discretion.

4

B.

The State's Argument Reads The Precedent Regarding The Prejudice Prong Analysis
Overly-Narrowly
The district court also misunderstood how much risk of undue prejudice the propensity

evidence carried in this case. As Mr. Castro pointed out, this is the type of evidence that carries
a risk of prejudice that a limiting instruction would not sufficiently restrict. (App. Br., pp.7-8
(comparing this case to State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664 (2010)).) The State ignores the part of
his argument, claiming that Mr. Castro has not addressed the presumption that jurors fo How the
Court's instructions. (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State is mistaken, because that is precisely the point
Mr. Castro was addressing by comparing to Johnson.
In Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly recognized there are certain situations
where, despite being given a limiting instruction, the risk of undue prejudice is so high that the
courts the jurors will still consider the evidence for propensity purposes (i.e., they will be unable
to follow the limiting instruction). Johnson, 148 Idaho at 670. The State contends that Johnson
is not applicable because, in Johnson the propensity evidence was for the same specific conduct
that had been charged in the case at bar. (Resp. Br., p.10.) Johnson is not so limited. See, e.g.,

State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459 (Ct. App. 2010).
In Pokorney, the Court of Appeals considered whether evidence of the defendant writing
a letter to his son, the alleged victim, would be admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) in a case alleging
lewd conduct.

Pokorney 149 Idaho at 463-64.

Even though the propsensity evidence

(attempting to influence a witness) was not for the same sort of specific conduct as the charged
conduct, the Court of Appeals still applied the Johnson rationales to its evaluation of the question
of prejudice.

Id. at 466.

Therefore, the State's attempt to distinguish Johnson is wholly

unpersuasive.
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More importantly, the Pokorney Court held that the district court abused its discretion in
weighing the risk of prejudice because it did not act appreciate the nature of the prejudice
recognized in Johnson:
Particularly in light of Grist and Johnson ... we must conclude that the district
court erroneously balanced the probative value against the prejudicial effect of the
evidence. Even with a limiting instruction, there was a high risk that the jury
would convict Pokorney based upon propensity and sexual deviancy. We are
constrained to conclude that the unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the
probative value of the evidence.
Id. at 466; see also State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 229 n.3 (2007) (reaching a similar
conclusion in the context of a methamphetamine charge).
The district court here, like the district court in Pokorney, abused its discretion because it
did not appreciate the extent of the risk of undue prejudice this sort evidence carries, as discussed
in Johnson.

In fact, propensity evidence that speaks to the allegations in a sentencing

enhancement usually need to be presented in a bifurcated trial because of the risk of undue
prejudice associate with that sort of evidence. See, e.g., State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766, 768
(1975) (requiring bifurcation of trials in regard to a sentencing enhancement based on prior
convictions because to offer evidence relevant to that enhancement in the case-in-chief "is to run
a great risk of creating prejudice in the minds of the jury that no instruction of the court can
wholly erase.") (internal quotation omitted). This is not to say that evidence relevant to an
enhancement can never come in during the State's case-in-chief See, e.g., State v. Thumm, 153
Idaho 533, 540 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that, where gang membership was only being used to
show a witness's bias, rather than that the defendant committed the charged crime, the risk of
undue prejudice did not require excluding the evidence). However, admission of the evidence in
that circumstance would be because the risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh
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the relevance of the evidence in that circumstance, not because the risk of undue prejudice itself
was lower than in other contexts.
The problem in Mr. Castro's case is that the district court did not appreciate the nature
and extent of the undue prejudice that accompanies this sort of propensity evidence, and so, its
resulting weighing of the probative value against the risk of undue prejudice was an abuse of its
discretion. Compare Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 466. Therefore, as in Pokorney, the decision to
admit that evidence should be reversed, especially since, even with its flawed understanding of
the risk of prejudice, this was a close call for the district court.

C.

The Standard The State Uses For Its Harmless Error Argument Is Inconsistent With
Idaho Supreme Court And United States Supreme Court Precedent And Would, If Used,
Create An Independent Violation Of The Fifth Amendment
In State v. Perry, the Idaho Supreme Court made it clear that, "in Idaho, the harmless

error test established in Chapman is now applied to all objected-to error." State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209 (2010) (referencing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). Under Chapman, an
error requires reversal "unless the State proves 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at
24) (emphasis from Perry). in order to determine whether an error "contribute[d] to the verdict
obtained," the appellate court must look to "the basis on which 'the jury actually rested its
verdict."' Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,279 (1993) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,
404 (1991)) (emphasis from Sullivan).
In this case, the prosecutor repeatedly and specifically urged the jurors to consider
Mr. Castro's gang affiliations to prove his guilt. (Tr., p.286, Ls.22 - p.287, L.5; p.297, Ls.21-23;
p.298, Ls.11-18).) As a result, and for the reasons discussed in Section B, supra, the State has
failed to carry its burden to prove there was no reasonable possibility that this error contributed
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to the verdict obtained, that it was not part of the basis on which this jury actually rested its
verdict.
The State attempts to avoid this conclusion by argumg for a different standard for
evaluating harmless error - that this Court should ignore the possibility that the jurors considered
the erroneously-introduced evidence and usurp the jury's role to weigh the other evidence itself
(Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that this is improper.
In fact, in Sullivan, the Supreme Court explained that using the State's standard would
result in an independent violation of the defendant's constitutional rights: "to hypothesize a
guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the findings to support
that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee." 1

Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279

(emphasis added). The reason such a decision would violate the Constitution is because, were a
judge to make the determination that the defendant would have been found guilty based on
allegedly-overwhelming evidence, it would be "the wrong entity judg[ ing] the defendant guilty."
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (explaining trial judges cannot order a guilty verdict

"regardless of how overwhelmingly the evidence may point in that direction" because of the
"Sixth Amendment's clear command to afford jury trials in serious criminal cases").
However, it is necessary to note that the Court of Appeals has held that Sullivan's
analysis should only be applied to claims of structural error, not Chapman harmless error.
State v. Joslin,_ P.3d _ , 2019 WL 4941722 (Ct. App. 2019) (refusing to "read the Sullivan
1

In other words, just as the courts will not "speculate on the course of action the investigation
could have taken in the absence of [the error]-even if that alternate course likely would have
yielded the evidence" because that would allow the inevitable discovery doctrine to swallow the
exclusionary rule, State v. Maxim, _ P.3d _ , 2019 WL 6519992, *7 (2019); id. at *8 (the
dissenting justices agreeing with this analysis), they should not speculate on the course a trial
could have taken in the absence of the error-even if that alternate course likely would have
yielded a conviction - because that would allow the harmless error doctrine to swallow the rules
excluding improper evidence.
8

language into the Chapman standard"), rev. pending. Rather, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the decision in State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46 (2017), allows for the use of an
overwhelming evidence standard. Joslin, 2019 WL 4941722, *3. Joslin, which is not yet final
and a petition for review 1s pending, misreads Sullivan's analysis and misconstrues

Montgomery's evaluation. 2
Sullivan was evaluating a constitutionally-deficient reasonable-doubt instruction
specifically to determine whether such errors always required reversal, or whether the resulting
verdict could still be affirmed as harmless error. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 276. In order to determine
whether the harmless error test from Chapman could be applicable in that situation, the Supreme
Court first had to explain what the Chapman test would require it to do:
In Chapman v. California, we rejected the view that all federal constitutional
errors in the course of a criminal trial require reversal. . . . Although most
constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error analysis, some
will always invalidate the conviction. The question in the present case is to which
category the present error belongs.

Chapman itself suggests the answer. Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the
question it [Chapman] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect
the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable
jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.
Harmless-error review looks, we have said, to the basis upon which the jury
actually rested its verdict. The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial
that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered,
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely
unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty
verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter how inescapable the fmdings
to support that verdict might be-would violate the jury-trial guarantee.

2

To the extent Montgomery actually endorses the "overwhelming evidence" standard argued by
the State, it should be overruled for because it is inconsistent with the controlling precedent
discussed infra. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77 (1990) (reiterating that the
Courts should overrule a prior decision when, inter alia, it is manifestly wrong or overruling it is
necessary to vindicate obvious principles oflaw).

9

Once the proper role of an appellate court engaged in the Chapman inquiry is
understood, the illogic of harmless-error review in the present case becomes
evident.
Id. at 279-80 (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted). Once it properly understood

what the Chapman test required, the Sullivan Court went on to explain why that analysis could
not be conducted with respect to the jury-instruction error at issue.

Id. at 280.

As such,

Sullivan's discussion of what Chapman requires is binding. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 227-28

(summarizing that Idaho uses the Chapman test and that Sullivan has only identified an
exception to the Chapman test that is specific to errors in the jury instructions). As a result,
Joslin's refusal to accept Sullivan's articulation of the Chapman standard actually requires,
Joslin, 2019 WL 4941722, *3, is manifestly wrong.

This is particularly true because Joslin's alternative standard- looking just at whether the
other evidence would support a guilty verdict because it was overwhelming - is contrary to the
plain, ordinary principles of law in this regard. In fact, the first case in which the United States
Supreme Court considered the concept of harmless error, it expressly rejected the Second
Circuit's use of an overwhelming evidence analysis: "It may be, as the Court of Appeals found,
that the evidence concerning each petitioner was so clear that conviction would have been
dictated and reversal forbidden, ... [b]ut whether so or not is neither our problem nor that of the
Court of Appeals for this case.

That conviction would, or might probably, have resulted in

properly conducted trial is not the criterion .... " Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 77576 (1946).
There has been some confusion in the articulation of that rule since Kotteakos, but the
Supreme Court has always returned to the same basis, rejecting harmless error evaluations based
solely on what the other evidence might show.
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For example, in Fahy v. Connecticut, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed:

"We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient

evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of

[i.e., whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt]. The question here is whether there
was a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). More notably, in Chapman itself, the
Supreme Court found the error was not harmless despite the fact that it found the Government's
evidence to be "reasonably strong." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24-26.
Finally, when it adopted the Chapman test, the Idaho Supreme Court also tried to resolve
any disparity caused by the varying articulations of the standard. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 22122.

It explained that all the different evaluations, including those that talked in terms of

overwhelming evidence, shared the same central analysis - of whether the erroneouslyintroduced evidence contributed to the jury's decision (as opposed to whether the other evidence
by itself would still likely have netted a conviction). 3 Id. (citing, inter alia, State v. Stoddard,
105 Idaho 169 (Ct. App. 1983), in which the Court of Appeals found an error to be harmless
because "we find nothing in the record to suggest that the remarks about the flashlight materially
affected the outcome. Stoddard has not contested the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
jury's verdict.")). This is the point both Joslin and the State in this case fail to appreciate by
arguing that the error was not harmless because the other evidence alone would be enough to
support a conviction.

Therefore, both should be rejected as inconsistent with the applicable

controlling precedent.
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Even Montgomery shares this central analysis. See Montgomery, 163 Idaho at 44 (essentially
explaining that the error - improperly allowing rebuttal witnesses to rebut the defendant's
testimony by offering more specific details about the allegations - was harmless because, in the
context of the rest of the evidence, the points discussed by the rebuttal testimony were not really
in dispute or relevant to the overarching charge, and so, no reasonable possibility the rebuttal
testimony affected the jury's deliberations on the charges filed).
11

Rather, as discussed supra, there is a reasonable possibility the jurors in this case
considered the erroneously-admitted evidence of Mr. Castro's gang affiliation in their
determination of his guilt. After all, the prosecutor repeatedly and specifically urged them to do
so. (Tr., p.286, Ls.22 - p.287, L.5; p.297, Ls.21-23; p.298, Ls.11-18).) Since the State has failed
to carry its burden under the proper standard, this Court should reverse the erroneous decision to
admit that evidence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Castro respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse the
order admitting the evidence of his gang affiliation in the first part of the bifurcated trial, and
remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 16th day of January, 2020.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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